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Abstract--This paper reports the successful results of the first stage of a
research effort to develop a versatile computer model of motivated human
cognitive behavior. Most human decision making appears to be an
experience-based, relatively straightforward, largely automatic, response to
situations, utilizing cues and opportunities perceived from the current
environment. The development, considering emotions, of the architecture
and computer program associated with such "recognition-primed" decision-
making is described. The resultant computer program (MoCogl) was
successfully utilized as a vehicle to simulate earlier findings that relate how
an individual's implicit theories orient the individual toward particular
goals, with resultant cognitions, affects and behavior in response to their
environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Society's need to understand, predict, plan for, design for, and respond to
human behavior is widely accepted. NASA, in its lead role in manned
space activities (and associated ground operations), and its role in research
for manned aircraft operations, has a similar need. Further, the
approaching era of manned space stations and space exploration carries
with it the promise of advanced automation featuring intelligent computer
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programs and machines. If such systems are to achieve a truly symbiotic
relation with humans, Poison [30] and Connors [9] indicate that these
systems will require sophisticated modeling of their human partners. They
state that such models must incorporate information processing models of
the task and the user. Issues include operator attention and vigilance, safe
transition from automatic to manual modes of operation, and allocation of
functions between man and machine that exploit the complementary
strengths of human and machine, permitting one to compensate for the
weaknesses of the other. (One of the human weaknesses listed by Poison
[30, p. 190] is emotional and motivational problems). The need for
sophisticated human-modeling can be expected to become even more
important _ manned long-mngespace missions are considered with their
potential for associated psychological problems (cf. [19]).
To help support these needs, a computer model that adequately simulates
(and aids in explaining) human behavior during activities associated with
NASA's missions would be a valuable asset. However, no model
adequately simulating internal motivations as well as external behavior has
been found. Therefore, we have begun the process of constructing such a
simulation. AS this is a formable task, considering our current level of
knowledge, we have chosen to proceed incrementally. This paper describes
MoCogl, a successful computer simulation associated with the first stage of
our research effort. However, before discussing MoCogl, we will briefly
review some relevant aspects of human decision making and the role of
emotions.
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II. HUMAN BEHAVIOR
A. Decision Making
Based on the work of Buck, Lazarus, McClelland and Mueller [6, 22, 23,
and 24], human decision making and action can be viewed as a response to
an individual's activated goals. The importance to the individual of these
goals is reflected in their accompanying emotions. Which goal is salient is
determined by the associated emotional level. Goal salience shifts as an
encounter unfolds. Based on the individual's coping potential, there is an
associated action potential. Success or failure in achieving these activated
goals is accompanied by a response emotion of related strength. Success of
a goal does not automatically lead to an action, but the resulting positive
emotion could potentiate other decisions. Failure of a goal and its resulting
negative emotion can engender recovery goals.
Decision making is a result, not only of the goal being pursued, but of the
knowledge, resources and perception that is made salient. The knowledge
that is made salient is a function of the activated schemas and episodes in
long term memory. Schema activations tend to decay with time.
Schema activation is facilitated by [31, pp. 52, 99]:
1. Emotions that tap into past experiences having the same emotions,
2. Perceived external cues.
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3. Focussed attention that results in schema calling (accessing) conditions.
4. Spillover to other schemas from activated schemas having shared
features.
5. Remaining activations in schemas recently activated.
6. Schemas that have frequently been used, so their their activation
threshold is very low.
Attention is very much a function of the schema activations that have
sufficient intensity so that they reach the individual's (limited capacity)
conscious working memory. Activated emotions tend to focus attention on
some concerns and in the process distract attention from other concerns
that are not so pressing [22, p. 17].
B. Emotions
Based on the work of Baron, Buck and Lazarus [3, 6, and 22], we conclude
that emotions are an individual's reactions to his/her appraisal of ho w one
is doing in one's lifelong effort to survive and flourish. Emotions depend
on appraisal and the resulting coping process. Emotion influences
cognition and cognition influences emotion. Emotions bias all decisions.
Emotions _not o_n!y provide anfindication of__the____personal_:_. ......importance of an
event, but the associated subjective experience provides a feedback for self-
regulation, and the external expressive behavior serves as a basis for social
coordination.
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Primary appraisal of a situation addresses whether and how an encounter is
relevant to a person's well-being. Lazarus [22, p. 39] lists the primary
appraisal components as:
o goal relevance
o goal congruency or incongruency
o type of ego-involvement.
Secondary appraisal is an evaluation of a person's options and resources for
coping with the situation and future prospects. The secondary appraisal
components are:
o blame or credit
o coping potential
o future expectations.
There are two kinds of appraisal processes -- one that operates
automatically without awareness or volitional control, and another that is
conscious, deliberate, and volitional [22, p. 169]. "Appraisal does not
imply rationality, deliberateness, or consciousness" [22, p. 152].
Lazarus [22, p. 108] reports that emotion can often be generated by the
mere memory of a prior emotional state or occasion. The feature of a
current transaction that could have been "... responsible for the memory
could be the emotional response pattern, the psychological situation and
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personal meanings that have generated the emotion, which are similar in
some sense to what happened in the earlier encounter..."
C. Motivations
Drawing on the work of Buck, Lazarus, and McClelland [6, 22, and 23] we
conclude that it is a person's pattern of motivation that gives encounters
their valence and power to provoke emotion. Individuals have different
goals, such as different levels of of needs for achievement, affiliation, and
power, and a desire to maintain a certain kind of ego identity. It is one's
motives that make one active in pursuing a goal, sensitive to cues relating
to a goal, and quick to learn what is necessary to reach a goal.
In addition to inborn primes (basic motives) [6], implicit motives (which
can not readily be verbally elicited from an individual) are acquired early
in life on the basis of important nonverbal affective experiences. Self-
attributed (explicit) motives, which can verbally be reported by
individuals, are acquired later in life from social, linguistically
conceptualized experiences.
McClelland's (ef. [23]) work on implicit motivation has focussed on the
needs for achievement, power, and affiliation, and their associated
emotional and cognitive aspects. Weinberger and McClelland [36] contrast
McClelland's traditional implicit motivation "needs" approach, which is
predictive of long term behavior, with that of the explicit cognitive-based
"self-schemas" which provide characterizations of individuals which result
in more situation-oriented behavior.
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In regard to explicit motives, Lazarus concludes that the most important
personality variables affecting emotion are motives and beliefs about self
and the world that have been acquired in the course of living [22, p. 87].
Lazarus [22, p. 150] reports that these explicit motives (associated with
ego-involvement) refer to diverse aspects of ego-identity, such as:
self- and social-esteem
moral values
ego-ideals
meanings and ideas
other persons and their well-being and
life goal s.
D. Coping
Lazarus [22] observes that coping consists of cognitive and behavioral
efforts to manage specific external or internal demands (and conflicts
between them) that the individual appraises as taxing or exceeding the
individual's resources. It is a response to the specific goals being
threatened.
Coping strategies can be problem-focussed or emotion-focussed. Coping
flows from emotion and follows an initial appraisal of such factors as
harm, threat, or challenge. It can modify the subsequent appraisal, thereby
changing or even short-circuiting the emotional reaction.
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Problem-focussed coping changes the relationship, and hence the emotion,
by actively doing something to either the environment or the person.
Emotion-focussed coping changes the relationship by attention deployment,
as in avoidance, or by altering the personal meaning on which the emotion
is predicated [22, p. 125].
III. APPROACH
A computer model that adequately simulates human cognition and behavior
depending upon environmental factors, the individual, and the individual's
goals would be very desirable for many purposes. However, we have not
yet found such a model. Izard [18], and others, suggest that emotions are
primary in human behavior. However, Eysenck and Keane [12, p. 496]
report that most Cognitive Psychologists have not considered emotional
factors. Nevertheless, there have been attempts at modeling cognition,
usually focussing on abstract thinking, and largely ignoring the influence of
emotions. An early effort was ACT* by Anderson [2] which had a
declarative memory in the form of a semantic net. ACT* focussed on the
memory and processing structures that form the basis of human task
performances. A more recent effort to develop a unified theory of
cognition is SOAR [25] that focuses on universal subgoaling for cognition,
and "chunking" for learning. Another approach [10], not yet developed
into a working computer program, has taken the neural net operation of
the brain as a basis for developing a general theory of human behavior.
We begin our effort toward developing the needed model by defining
"motivated cognition" as the process that emphasizes the role of affects in
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human cognition and decision making. Unfortunately,there appears to be
no universal definition of affects. For example, Baron [3, p. 454] states
that, "An affect is any mental state that biases a behavior," while Lazarus
[22, p. 57] observes that, "... it is fashionable to speak of affect ... to refer
to the subjective quality of an emotional experience." Though the terms
affects and emotions are often used interchangeably, we will try to use the
terms so that their meanings are clear from the context. In general, we will
follow the lead of Buck [6] and define affects as the motivational system
underlying emotion. In Buck's framework, emotions are interpreted as the
readout process -- self-awareness and outward expression -- carrying
information about motivation.
Affects appear to be a major contributor to the distinctly different way in
which human decision making is done relative to the more rational
approaches generally considered in artificial intelligence. To date there has
been a dearth of computer programs emphasizing the role of affects,
though Colby [8], Thagard and Kunda [35], Woods, et al. [38], O'Rorke, et
al. [26], and Sanders [33] have all made contributions in this direction.
DAYDREAMER [24] is the most sophisticated such program thus far
developed, and Pfeifer [29] recently reviewed artificial intelligence
computer models of emotion.
Reason [31 ] indicates that human decision making, in response to a task, can
be viewed as consisting of three levels -- Skill-based (procedural), Rule-
based (or analogical), and Knowledge-based (conscious abstract decision
making).
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Most human decision making appears to be of the experience-based,
relatively straight-forward, largely automatic, type of response to internal
goals and drives, given cues, situations, and opportunities perceived from
the current environment. This automatic, basically non-analytic, decision
making in response to environmental factors is very common in humans,
particularly when they are under stress. Such decision making has been
referred to by Klein [20] as "recognition-primed decisions," while Jacoby
and Kelley [17] see such behavior as episode-guided, and we can also relate
this form of behavior to Reason's [31] Rule-based behavior. In this paper
we will, for the sake of simplicity, group this general form of decision
making under the name "recognition-primed."
Recognition-primed decision making is not oni_/comm_0n in everyday life,
it is also the type of decision making that separatesexperts from novices.
Whereas experts are often able to automatically find a solution based on
past experience, novices usually must laboriously think through a situation
to reach an answer. Thus, Klein [20] found, that for experts working
under tittle-constraints, problem recognition an-d-resultant goal selection
was largely automatic (with occasional deeper sequential evaluation of
automatically-recalled procedures taking place until a "satisficing" solution
was found). One can expect similar behavior among experienced pilots,
astronauts, and ground controllers responding to stressful time-constrained
situations. _s_ty_ae of beh/ivior isin contrast t0-thoseincidents of human
decision making in which planning -- associated with Reason's Knowledge-
based level -- is a central ingredient (of. [5]).}
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Jacoby and Kelley [17, pp. 454, 456] also report findings supportive of
situation-primed decision making, arguing that, "When the current
situation is very similar to a past situation, it effectively functions as a
retrieval cue for the past situation. However, retrieval of the past situation
need not be experienced as conscious remembering. Instead, the past
experience can unconsciously guide responses to the current situation ....
The difference between a schema and the episodic view is the level of
abstraction of the memory representation that is said to guide behavior."
An episodic view refers to a specific single past experience. A schema
refers to a generalization of such experiences.
Though, it is not necessary to emphasize it for recognition-primed
decisions, the ultimate decision-maker in humans (cf. [14]) is the structure
provided by the combination of innate motivations and those programmed
into the human unconscious during the human growth and maturation
process. Associated with these motivations are emotional charges which
tend to direct our thoughts and behaviors. Mueller's [24] computer
program, DAYDREAMER, is a good initial approach to an artificial
intelligence program that simulates the resultant response. The focus of his
program is emotionally-based control of the human "train of thought."
Processes of this type -- which control how the mind recalls associated
information and moves its focus of attention about as it attends to the
current situation -- are central to our follow-on report and its
accompanying simulation (MoCog2). MoCog2 is being designed to handle
much more complex thought and decision processes than the relatively
automatic, single-pass, recognition-primed decision making described in
this current paper.
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Pursuant to the long term goal of developing a sophisticated model of
humans, the aim of our initial research has been to develop a computer
model of human decision making that focuses on the impact of affects.
Following our incremental approach, we have first devised a simulation of
recognition-primed decision making, considering the role of emotions. We
then tested this simulation against Dweck and Leggett's [I 1] real
psychological data to see if this paradigm was adequate to describe ',he
reported behavior.
Our longer term plan is to couple the human decision making approach
from the perspective of information processing in the human brain (cf. [3],
[15], [28], and [I0]), with a synthesis of current psychological theories in
motivated cognition (cf. [21], [1]' [6], [11], [16], [22], [23], and [21]), the
long and short term memory conceptualizations of Reason [31], and the
emotional control of attention work of Mueller [24].
It is important to note that at this stage of our knowledge, much of what is
discussed in this paper should be treated as hypothetical rather than as fact.
However, if based on these hypotheses our resultant computer models show
adequate predictability and explanatory capability when applied to existing
studies and future experiments, then our purposes will have been served.
IV. DERIVING A MODEL FROM BRAIN RESEARCH
Affects are the motivational systems most commonly associated with
emotions. From emotions, arise subjective experience and expressive
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behavior (and autonomic physiological response). Humans appear to be
born with (or with the potential for) basic affect characteristics. Basic
affects are associated with the lower levels of brain development,
particularly with that of the limbic system.
Based on Baron [3], Buck [6] and McClelland [23], Fig. 1 is a simplified
flow diagram of what might be considered basic inborn human responses to
internal body and brain states. "Primary emotions are those that emerge at
birth or at least within the first year of life. They express the most
important adaptational tasks of animals such as protection from danger,
reproduction, orientation, and exploration" [22, p. 79].
Derived from the work of Buck [6], Baron [3], and others, Fig. 2 illustrates
our view of some of the affects encountered as one moves from the lower
levels to the higher levels of the brain, though several of these affects are
not available until later in the maturation process.
Based on the preceding, and on Baron's [3] treatise, we have augmented the
elementary flow diagram of Fig. 1 for motivated behavior to include the
higher levels of the brain, as indicated in Fig. 3. Fig. 3 depicts the basic
sequential information processing flow between various portions of the
brain (detailed in Baron's treatise) having different functions, timing, and
other characteristics. One way of viewing Fig. 3 is as a linked structure of
brain memory and processsing components appropriate for studying
sequential eposodic and schema activations, considering emotions, in
response to internal or external stimuli. The structure includes a function
by which the brain attempts to produce a favorable output affect vector by
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automatic unconscious selection from available coping strategies. The affect
patterns referred to in the diagram can be considered to be vectors of
affects indicating their degree of activation.
An individual responds to the world based not only on the current event
but also on the individual's internal physiological and mental states. Thus,
both of the lower two paths shown in Fig. 3 provide inputs to the brain's
decision making mechanism. But before elaborating on these pat_- and the
resultant decision making, let us briefly review some of the fund_,:'ental
aspects of brain functioning on which our approach is based (cf. [3], and
[iS]).
Baron [3] and others suggest that the brain stores all experiences to which
the individual pays conscious attention, in additi0n, Restak [32, p. 264]
conclUdes that "First, information can be incorporated into the mind
without access to conscious awareness. Secondly, conscious intention
cannot modify certain aspects of cognition." Restak also observes (p. 243)
that" .. Such_memories are _'stored,' but in most instances they cannot
consciously be voluntarily recollected."
In the bra_n; Sto-redaiong wit_ each experience are the affects that were
present at the initiation of the experience and those that resulted from the
experience. The affect patterns thus associated with the pre-conditions and
_ eXl_-_ence _areaccessi_ledufin_ future interactions'
Thus, when an eve_[s_rceived it iS automatically compared With =the
2 22_7 :
store of past even_sand depending upon Slmilarity conditions [3, p. 571,
the associated affect patterns are activated. Thus, the brain automatically
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renders a judgment on the degree to which this event is "for me or against
me." (This pattern is consistent with Jacoby and Kelley's [17] episode
guided control of behavior, but contrasts with the consciously-oriented
cognitive appraisal emotion taxonomy of Ortony et al. [27]).
With this view, we can now follow the lower path in Fig. 3. Attributes of
an event are observed by the sensory system, and the resulting sensory
signals are compared with stored visual, auditory and other sense
experiences. These then elicit past situations and associated affect patterns
which had similar patterns of sensory signals. This results in the current
situation being perceived in terms of similar past situations and their
associated affect patterns. The resulting inputs to the stored events yield a
perceived event. The perceived event and its associated affect pattern may
then activate associated ideas, concepts, and their stored affect patterns.
These serve as a prediction of the consequence of the current event and its
resultant affect pattern.
Following the middle path of Fig. 3, receptors sense the body's internal
physiological state and the individual's current mental state, thereby
activating the associated affect centers. This activation is combined with
the activation induced by the affect patterns from the perceptions associated
with the bottom path. The combined result is a current emotional state, or
affect pattern (indicated in the top path of the figure).
We view an emotional "need" as the difference between this current (or
predicted) affect state and the optimal affect state (defined in a manner
similar to that used by Baron, [3, pp. 468-470]). Emotional "goals" can be
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viewed as the things that if achieved will satisfy emotional needs.
"Procedures" are actions or strategies to achieve such goals.
The current affect state and the expected affect states resulting from the
current event act as inputs to the brain's control mechanism, which
generates needs and goals to move the anticipated resultant affect state to a
more desirable condition. These needs and the current context elicit
applicable stored procedures. (This is in keeping with Sharkey and
Bower's [34] findings indicating that goals and plans are stored in memory
as associative structures.) The predicted results and affiliated affect
patterns (associated with the various applicable procedures) are then fed to
the decision making mechanism. This mechanism then seeks to select
procedures that would produce the most desirable overall satisfaction of the
generated emotional needs, considering the weights or priorities given each
affect and their current degree of activation.
V. SIMPLIFICATIONS USED IN DEVELOPING MOCOGI
To develop MoCogl, the simulation of recognition-primed human decision
making (our initial computer program), several Simplifications were made.
I. Because data on the day-to-day variations in the internal affect state
indicated by the middle path of Fig. 3 are often not available, this path has
not been simulated. Instead it has been approximated by assigning initial
values to the individuai_s relatively stable base(normal) affects such as self-
image, happiness, and self esteem.
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2. Each of the affect levels are taken to range linearly from -9 to 9 (from
very negative to very positive) or from -9 to 0 or 0 to 9, as appropriate.
3. As a first approximation, the value of the total affect state has simply
been taken as the sum of the individual affect states.
4. Affects have not been pdoritized.
5. Because of the lack of actual data, the vectors of incremental affect
values that procedures can be expected to produce are chosen subjectively.
6. In addition to the task preconditions, only the salient needs (those above
a critical level) are considered necessary to access applicable procedures.
With these simplifications, Fig. 3 reduces to Fig. 4 for simulating an
individual's response to a task.
Vl. A RELEVANT PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
As a test of the validity of recognition-primed decision making and
MoCogl, it was necessary to find a psychological study, of human
responses to a task, that includes the necessary attributes. Such a study
should include a characterization of the task and the individuals, and a
report of their responses, behavior and emotions. As sufficiently detailed
such studies appear hard to find, the published psychological study by
Dweck and Leggett [11] of upper-level grade school children responding to
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academic tests, was chosen as appearing to have the required ingredients.
We have used their work as a first test of our framework.
A significant computer program mirroring human behavior must be able
to simulate real psychological experiments and observations. However, if
an individual's response is based not only on the stimuli, but also on the
individual's inherent nature and life experiences, then programming an
individual's response means that these, or some attribute set or schema that
meaningfully summarizes them for the current situation being simulated,
have to be entered into the program. One approach has been to try to
characterize people by personality types with attributes such as introvert
and extrovert. Dweck and Leggett [1 I] have instead tried to build a system
based on the individual's world view.
Dweck and Leggett suggest that one's behavior is very much influenced by
how one views the world (a result of the world's responses to one's past
behavior). In particular, they focus on two views: (1) things in the world
being malleable and therefore subject to control and change, and (2) things
being relatively fixed and therefore relatively uncontrollable. If we
categorize something important to us as being uncontrollable, then our
relationship to it is to monitor, measure, or judge its attributes. Whereas,
if we view something important to us as controllable, then our response
tends to be to act on or develop it -- to understand and improve it. Table
l indicates the cognitions, behaviors, and affects associated with these two
views.
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Dweck and Leggett observe that behavior is situation-dependent and is
aimed at maximizing the composite positive affect (or minimizing the
negative affect) resulting from trying to balance the multiple goals in
response to the demands of the situation. This is consistent with Fig. 3
where the approach is to optimize a complex affect pattern.
Dweck and Leggett imply that their theory is applicable to many domains,
such as intelligence, social, moral, physical skills and even physical
attractiveness. Their theory is supported by observations of upper-level
grade-school children called upon to do intellectual tasks. Stemming from
the child's view of the world as either being fixed or malleable, the child
either has a performance orientation or goal (i.e., to be judged) or a
learning orientation or goal. Table 2 indicates this relationship. Based on
Dweck and Leggett's report, Table 3 is our depiction of the relationships
between (1) the students' general goal, their intelligence, and the task
difficulty, and (2) the resultant observed students' behaviors (strategies),
and reports by the students of their affects and cognitions. (Dweck and
Leggett's findings of observed behavior tend to be in line with the coping
strategies reported by Folkman, et al. [13] for adult subjects.) Observe that
the observations of Dweck and Leggett cover virtually the entire spectrum
of emotions and coping strategies thus far discussed in this paper.
The parameters associated with Dweck and Leggett's characterization of
students and tests in a testing situation are (l) general goal (performance,
learning); (2) intelligence (high, low); and (3) test difficulty (high, low,
very high -- that is beyond the capabilities of any student).
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Because Dweck and Leggett's report was an English language description,
it was necessary to make many assumptions to transform their non-
numerical data into a computer program. As an initial characterization of
the student, the student's normal (base level) affect attributes of self-image,
happiness and self-esteem were subjectively assigned on a scale of -9 to 9 to
vary from
self-image = 7
happiness = 7
self-esteem = 6
for a high intelligence learning-oriented individual to
self-image = 3
happiness = 3
self-esteem = 2
for a low intelligence performance-oriented individual.
Self-image is defined as "the self as the individual pictures or imagines it to
be. The self-image may differ widely from the true self," [7, p. 478].
"Self-esteem is a positive attitude towards oneself and One's behavior.
Quite often it is a iasting-l_rsonai disposition, but ihe _lf evaluation may
shift depending on one's environment," [37, p. 309].
VII. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM
MoCogl, the computer program we devised to simulate Dweck and
Leggett's student responses to intellectual tasks, consists primarily of
heuristic PROLOG rules to calculate responses from input data at each
input-output module shown in the flow diagram in Fig. 4. {As an
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alternative, more consistent with the nature of the brain and as a more
universal generalization, the modules can be programmed as neural nets or
connectionist networks (cf. [4]) rather than by the use of rules. However,
little is likely to be gained at this stage through programming in neural nets
because the limited psychological data we have been able to find has tended
to be suggestive of the rule-based form.}
A. Task Difficult),
Task difficulty was calculated as the students' perceptual responses to
attributes of the tests based on the students' past experiences. Thus task
difficulty of the various tests was calculated as a function of the subject,
number of pages, and test duration.
B. Task Low-level Affect Consequences
The primary low-level task affects of anxiety, pleasure, and boredom
associated with perceived task difficulty were subjectively chosen as a
function of the perceived task difficulty, the student's intelligence, and the
student's general goal (of performance or learning).
C. Mid-level Anticipated Success or Failure Response
The predicted mid-level cognitive response for the performance-oriented
students was chosen as success for students whose ability (intelligence) was
equal to or greater than that required by the test, and as failure for those
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students whose capabilities were inadequate for the test. All the learning-
oriented students anticipated success.
D. Mid-level Affect Response
The mid-level affect response (of pride, shame, and self-image increment)
to the anticipated event outcome was computed as a function of the low-
level affects, the student's general goal of learning or performance, the
student's intelligence, and the student's perceived task difficulty.
E. Predicted Outcome
The predicted outcome for all the students with a general goal of learning
was taken as "learned." The performance-oriented students' predicted
outcome was "judged positively" for those Who anticipated success, and
"judged negatively" for those who anticipated failure.
F. Predicted Outcome Affects
The high level affect response -- of happiness and self esteem increments --
associated with the students' view of the anticipated outcome was
subjectively chosen as (1) high level affect increments of +1 each if the
anticipated outcome was learned or judged positively; or (2) happiness
reduced by 3, and self esteem by 1, if the outcome was judged negatively.
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G. Needs
The overall affect pattern was simply the vector constructed by appending
the base and low and mid level affects to the high level affects. The need
list was constructed by subtracting the resultant affect vector from the ideal
affect vector. Relevant needs were then taken to be all elements of the need
list that exceeded a value of 3 (which appeared to be a good dividing point
based upon the simulation results).
H. Procedures
Procedures are the learned techniques accessible to the students to contend
with their current situation (considering their needs and the context). The
procedure chosen for execution is the procedure that maximizes the
resultant affect total.
VIII. RESULTS OBTAINED USING MOCOGI
AND LEGGETT'S DATA
WITH DWECK
Fig. 5 is a printout of a trace of an interaction between a computer user
and the MoCogl program as applied to the data of Dweck and Leggett [11].
Following step by step through this interaction will help illuminate our
simulation.
Based on the Dweck and Leggett data and the present model, Jan
(considered in Fig. 5) is a construct of the high intelligence, learning-
oriented type of individual. Fig. 6 is a projection onto Fig. 4 of the
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computer simulation of Jan's response to a difficult test. Based on the test's
attributes of subject, length, etc., Jan perceives the example mathematics
test as being of high difficulty. Associated with this difficulty, Jan's
previous experiences cause Jan to experience some anxiety, but also the
pleasure of impending challenge. At the next level, experience with this
degree of difficulty, causes Jan to anticipate a successful outcome, resulting
in an associated mid-level affect pattern of pride and bolstered self-image.
Based on feelings (and automatic perceptions) associated with the event, Jan
views the test as a likely successful learning experience, and experiences a
feeling of increased happiness and self-esteem. The relatively diminutive
level of needs resulting from Jan's composite affect pattern facilitates
access to Jan's rational capabilities- (procedures). Thus, high persistence
and self-mastery are open to Jan, and the automatic choice of maximum
need satisfaction results in Jan exhibiting self-mastery. The associated
affect total (shown on the Fig. 6 simulation flow diagram) is the result of
assuming that the affect effects of a procedure can be simply vectorially
added to the existing overall affect structure and then totaled by linearly
adding up the resultant components.
Rob (Fig. 7) is a construct of the low intelligence, performance-oriented
individual. Based on the history test's attributes, Rob perceives it as being
difficult. As shown in Figs. 7 and 8, Rob's experience with difficult tests
results in a low-level affect response of anxiety, negative pleasure, and
boredom with another frustrating task. Sensing the task difficulty results
in a mid-level response of expected failure with associated shame and
decreased _if image_::::Base_t_e feelings and insights resulting from the
, z ::_ ......
event, Rob's view of the outcome is that Rob will again be judged
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negatively with resultant loss of happiness and self-esteem. Rob's high
level of needs opens up a whole range of defensive response strategies that
can be used to reduce the stress. Self-aggrandizement, with its associated
rebuilding of self-image and self-esteem, appears to be the most optimal.
This is consistent with Dweck and Leggett's data that show that some two
thirds of the performance-oriented students engaged in self-aggrandizement
or diversionary behavior. [Note: Rob's response to a test of very high
difficulty (not shown) results in such an emotional upset that, in our
simulation, Rob has access to only one procedure -- ineffective strategies.]
Table 4 lists the author's subjective assumptions of the effects on need
reduction of the procedures utilized in the computer runs for these two
examples. Comparable procedure effects have been employed for the other
computer runs, which cover the full range of categories covered by Dweck
and Leggett's results. It should be noted that the influence on affects of
applying various procedures can be expected to be somewhat student
specific, which coupled with the students' idiosyncratic backgrounds and
the day-to-day variations in students' affect levels, would help to account
for the various procedural choices observed in Dweck and Leggett's study
for the same situations.
IX. DISCUSSION
To obtain a computer simulation of human responses to situations it is
evident that it is necessary to:
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1. Characterize the individual using such attributes as intelligence,
personality, views, belief systems. Unfortunately, Lazarus [22, p. 6]
observes, "Personality is seldom explored as a complex, integrated system.
• .. Instead, research in personality tends to be about one or a few traits
with little or no attention paid to how they are organized in an individual."
Methods for characterizing an individual, other than the Dweck and
Leggett's approach used in our simulation, include Jung's Personality
Typology with associated responsive strategic md the Woods et al. [38]
typology of problem solvers. However focus_:_g on aspects of the ego-
identity structure reported by Lazarus [22, pp. 87, 150], quoted earlier,
appears most promising.
2, Develop transformations based on the individual's Characterization, that
take the sensory input and develop perceptions of situations, events and
concepts, and their associated affect patterns:
3. Provide procedures or strategies (and their affect consequences) that the
individual is likely to be able to access via needs (as s_iated with the
composite affect state) and the context.
For simulating Dweck and Leggett's theory, we were guided by their
observations in choosing such things as applicable procedures, and used our
simulations to highlight..... how affects select from among the reachable
procedures. Obviously more work is needed to succinctly characterize
individuals and their available procedures as a function of generic contexts.
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In the process of constructing this simulation, the central finding was that
with relatively straightforward assumptions, it is possible to represent and
manipulate affect structures and resultant behavior to provide a plausible
simulation of affective behavior associated with recognition-primed human
decision making. To develop a computer program for the Dweck and
Leggett example, given the lack of numerical data, a great many
assumptions had to be made. These subjective assumptions were chosen to
be as consistent as possible with likely numerical data, had they been
available. The basic agreement with Dweck and Leggett's findings of this
computer simulation (see observed behaviors indicated by asterisks in
Table 3) obtained by the simple subjective assignment of attributes (with
virtually no tuning) to the various individual types, is an indication that our
normal views of individual characteristics may be in good agreement with
reality for studies of this type. It also suggests that relatively simple
computer programs may provide adequate simulations of many studies. An
interactive version of our simulation, providing examples that cover the
full range of categories in Dweck and Legge_'s findings, has been
packaged on a DOS diskette and is available for study.
Simulations, such as MoCogl (and the more advanced simulations to
follow), can act as structures to help organize various psychological
theories, as well as multiple verbally-reported observations from different
studies, into a consistent natural framework in which an individual's
theories, affects and behavior are integrated into an orderly and logical
flow. The relationships between variables in such simulations can be
expressed in any degree of rule-based, mathematical, or connectionist
specificity, allowing one to study human behavior in an explicit manner.
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In MoCogl, we have run the gamut from implicit motivations (and
associated emotions) common to all animals species, to explicit motivations
involved with ego (mediated by language, and with associated higher order
affects) only found in humans (see [36]).
The numerous assumptions that we made to construct our computer
simulation, provide a good indication of some of the research required.
First, it would be helpful to get a better representation of the affect
structure (perhaps pursuing the taxonomy suggested by Ortony, et al. [27],
and observing how it ties in with the work of Buck [6] and Lazarus [22]).
This should include which affects play a major role in cognition and
behavior, their relative priority, and how they should be combined in
obtaining an overall indication of need level. Further, though in our
simulation the chosen range (from -9 to 9, negative to positive) of each
affect was considered to be linear with limit cutoffs, it is more likely that
these ranges are nonlinear, _rhaps approximating a slgmoid shape similar
to that employed by COlby [8]. Thus, in generating the overall total need
..... : !
level or the effects of procedures, it would be desirable to find appropriate
nonlinear weighting functions.
In the MoCogl simulation of Dweck and Leggett's findings, the effect of
day-to-day individual variations in internal psychological and mental states
(represenied by_ t]ie_id[e_thin :F|g-! -3-)-hasten omitted.' :Again it: is
likely that these affects are not simply additive with those from the lower
path, but that they interact in a nonlinear fashion. This may be particularly
true when such factors as general arousal level are considered. In addition,
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initial affects may not only influence procedural choice, but may color
initial perceptions as well (an effect not currently included in Fig. 3).
MoCogl considers only one aspect of motivated decision making, that of
being automatically guided by past experience and its associated emotions.
One way of viewing MoCogl is as a structure appropriate for studying
sequential episodic and schema activations considering emotions, with
automatic unconscious selection from available coping strategies to produce
a favorable associated affect vector. Though MoCogl appears to be an
adequate approach to simulating motivated recognition-primed human
decision making, it is focussed on the unconscious, or what Reason [31]
refers to as the schematic control mode associated with long term memory.
To achieve real-time abstract thinking, we must focus on consciousness,
associated with working memory, or what Reason refers to as the
attentional control mode. It is the interaction between these two modes,
plus the schema activations associated with emotions, that is needed to
produce the motivated Knowledge-based reasoning of MoCog2 -- our
follow-on computer program.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have reviewed our development of a conceptual
architecture for recognition-primed human decision making, considering
emotions, and our efforts at programming Dweck and Leggett's findings as
an example based upon it. We have shown that it is possible to develop a
plausible simulation of the Dweck and Leggett findings based on
recognition-primed decision making (associated with automatic responses
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derived from an individual's experiences). Our work also illustrates that it
is possible to develop computer programs incorporating affects that show
promise of being consistent both with our current knowledge of
information processing in the brain and with actual psychological findings.
Further, the nature of such simulations not only provides new ways of
thinking about human mental and behavioral aspects, but strongly points
the way to needed research. Though very common, recognition-primed
decision making is only one type of human decision making. The success
of our simulation efforts for this simple form of motivated decision
making has encouraged us to proceed with our next simulation stage which
will incorporate more complex motivational factors, and their resultant
affects, in conjunction with more complex decision making.
3O
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Category Response
Table 1. Effect of perceptions of controllability
Affect Cognition Behavior
Uncontrollable Judgmental Evaluative
Controllable Developmental Empathetic
u
Rigid, over-simplified thinking
Process analysis, Sensitivity to
situational factors
Low initiation of and persis-
tence toward change
Mastery-oriented goal pursuit
Table 2. Relationship of students' goals to world view
ml , ,
World view General goal Goal orientation
Fixed entity Performance (cognitive judgment) Maximize positive judgments and
pride in ability, while minimizing
negative judgments, anxiety, and
shame
Maximize growth of ability and pride
and pleasure of mastery
Ma/leable Learning (competence enhancement)
Table 3. Relationship of students' behaviors in tests to the students' general goals
General goal Perceived own Task Resultant Goal Students' cognitions Observed behzvio_
aaributclevel difficulty affects
Performance High intelligence High Pride Seek positive judgment Success expected Mastery oriented*
(cognitive [Fru.n] Maintain and increase High persistence
judgment] sel f-esteem
Low Boredom Seekpositive judgment Successexpected Persistence
ifavailable Taskavoidance"
Veryhigh Anxie_ Avoidnegative Fallur_expected Defensivewithd_walofeffon
Boredom judgment Attributefailuretopersonal Self-agg'r'andiz_ment"
Shame inadequacy Ineffective strategies
Depression Loss of belief in efficacy of Low persistent,'
Reduced effor_ Taskavoidance
self-esteem Dividedattenrion Devaluetaskand evidence
Dislikeoftask boredom
Low hatelligence Very high Anxiety Avoid negative Failure expected Defensive withdrawal of effort
['Rob] Boredom judgment Attribute failure to personal Self-aggrandizement °
Shame inadequacy Ineffectivestrate_es
Depression Loss of belief in efficacy of Low persistence
Redu_d effort Taskavoidance
self-esteem Divided attention Devalue task and evidence
Dislike of task boredom
High Anxiety Avoidnegative Failurexpected Defensivewithdrawalofeffort
Boredom judgment Attribute failure to personal Self-aggrandizement"
Shame inadequacy Ineffectivestrategies
Depression Loss of belief in efficacy of Low persistence
Reduced effort Task avoidance
self-esteem Dividedattention Devaluetaskandevidence
Dislikeoftask boredom
Low Pride Seekpositive judgment Successexpected Mastery orignt)d"
Highpersistence
Laa.rning
(competence
enhancement)
High intelligence High Pleasure
[j_) _'idc
Low Boredom
Seek learning Success expected SdT-mastgry (effective
- --:'........ See:h_skasachallengetobe prob_em-s0lv_ngexperience
..... _ie-md-t.g/ou_effort sn-atigles)"
S_ck_n_ =U_Of_ "rS_ _ _p_UC_V_ _ Taskavoidance"
of time _ortlead[n_; to success
Veryhigh Pleasure
Pride
Low intelligenceVeq'high Pleasure
[Paq Pride
High Pleasure
Pride
Low Pleasun:
Pride
Seekverysatisfying Opporamityformorc
learningexperience satis_ngself-mastery
Currentfailurebutfuture
SUC_
Continuing belief in
Seekvery satisfying Opportunity for mort
learning experience satisfying self-mastery
Current failure but future
SUCCess
Continuing belief in
=et_Tcacv=6feffon
+: •
Seek ve_s_sf'_ng Opportunity for more
learning experience satisfying self-mastery
Current failure but future
$UCC_$
Continuing belief in
efficacy ofeffort
Seeklearning Successexpected
experience See task as a challenge to be
masteredthrough effort
gevisedorupgradedstrater/
Solution-orientedself-
insn"uction,self-monitoring,
and self-mastery"
R=vised orupg_dcd strategy
Solution-orientedself-
insu"uction,self-monitoring.
and self-n'astery=
Revisedor upg_ded strate_
Solution-orientedself-
instruction, self-monitoring.
andself.mastery"
Self-mastery °
High persistence
+
+
*Behaviorselectedby our simulation.
Table 4. Effect of choice of procedure on affect pattern increment
Situation Procedure Anxiety Pleasure Boredom Pride Shame Self- Happiness Self-
Image Esteem
Learning-oriented,
high-intelligence
individual faced with
high-difficuhy test
(Jan)
i
Performance-
oriented, low-
intelligence
individual faced with
high-difficulty test
(Rob)
Self-mastery +2 +3 +3 +2 0 +I + I + I
High persistence + I +2 0 +2 0 + I + I + I
Ineffective strategies -l -t 0 -I -2 -I -I -I
Defensive withdrawal +I +I +l -1 +1 -1 0 +I
Task avoidance +2 +l +I -] +! 0 +] 0
Self-aggrandizement +2 +l 0 +I +2 +I 0 +1
Task devaluement +l +l -I +I +I 0 +l 0
MoCogl
Figure Captions
Fig. 1 Elementary Preprogrammed Responses
Fig. 2 Tentative Affect Level Structure
Fig. 3 Flow Diagram of Recognition-Primed Human Decision Making
Fig. 4 Simplified Flow Diagram of an Individual's Response to a Task
Fig. 5 Trace of a User Interaction with a Computer Simulation of a
Learning-Oriented, High Intelligence Student's Response to a Test of
High Difficulty
Fig. 6 Projection onto Fig. 4 of a Simulation of a Learning-Oriented,
High-Intelligence Student's Response to a Test of High Difficulty
Fig. 7 Trace of a User Interaction with a Computer Simulation of a
Performance-Oriented, Low-Intelligence Student's Response to a
Test of High Difficulty
Fig. 8 Projection onto Fig. 4 of a Simulation of a Performance-Oriented,
Low-Intelligence Student's Response to a Test of High Difficulty
__ /Sensory --_Chemistry of Sensors Jl"_lnpu tBody and Brain
Limbic System
Specialized
Affect Centers
Hunger
Thirst
Sexual-arousal
Anger-Excitement_ PatternFear
Pleasure
Sadness-Distress
Interest-Surprise
Disgust
(Emotional
State)
Affect
Preprogrammed
Patterns of
]ehavior
Fighting
Laughing
Crying
Fear
Loving
Lust
Fleeing
Feedina
------_Response
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Mid-level
Shame
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Disgust
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Beliefs
Happiness
Self-esteem
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Learned
social origin
Intellectual origin
(Relatively stable long-
duration affects)
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Whlch s_UoQ_t are y_ :nterest_ in?
(fran. , roD° i jan. , pat. )
Be sure to lnEluOe the Deri=_,
&no do a carriage return after yo,Jr select%on.
j&n.
jan, of nigh intelligence,
has a general goal of learning
a normal m:d level affect of self image = 7
and a normal hlgh level affect pattern of
happiness = 7 and self esteem = b, on a scale of -9 to 9.
Which test are you considering?
(test1., test2., test3., test4., testS.)
testl.
Base_ on Its attributes, the difficulty of this
math test is perceived by jan to be hlgh
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yes.
Peroslving this test produces |n jan
a low level affect response of:
anxiety = -2, on a scale o_ -9 to 0
pleasure = 5, on a scala of -9 to 9
boredom - O, on a scale o_ -9 to 0
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yeS.
Sensing the task difficulty results in jan
havlng a feeling o_ expected suc=ess
and an associated mid Ievei affeot response o_
pride _ 5, on a scale of 0 to 9
shame - O, on a scale of -9 to 0
self image - 8, on a scale of -9 to 9
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yeS.
Based on feelings associated with the event,
_ans vie_ of the expected outcome is "learned" leading to an
Overall affeot pattern - [-2,5,0,5,0,8,9,7]
= [Anxiety, Pleasure, Boredom,
Pride, Shame, Self_Image Ne_,
Happiness_New, Self_Estemm_New]
and an associated Need_List = [2,4,0,4,0,I,1,2]
whlch is the difference between the ideal state and
_ans current overall affec_ pattern
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yeS.
Based on the preconditions of the task and the relevant
needs, the followlng procedures are avazlaDle to jan
computing -_
prmceourel = high_pereistance, Resultant affect total - 39
procedure2 - self mastery, Resultant affect total - 44
Sslscted proceOure is self mastery
If you wa_t to try the program again, type "dldb."
B:\>
., ,
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• I
• t
Which s_udent are you interested in?
(fram., rob., 2an., pat.)
Be sure to include the _eriod.
and do a carrlage returu after your selection.
rob.
rob, of low in_elligence,
has a general goal OZ performance
a normal mid level affec_ of self i=age = 3
and a mormal high level affect patter_ of
happlness = 3 amd self esteem = 2, on a scale of -9 to 9.
Which test are you considering?
(testl., tes_Z., tes_3,, test4., _estb.)
test2.
Based on its attributes, the dlfflcult7 oZ this
history tes_ is perceived DF rob to De high
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yes.
Perceiving this test produces in rob
a low level affect response of:
anxlety = -4, on a scale of -9 to 0
pleasure = -2, on a scale of -9 to
boredom = -3, on a scale of -9 to 0
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yes.
Sensing the task difficulty results in rob
having a feeling of expected failure
and an associated mid level affect response of
pride = O, on a scale of 0 to 9
shame = -4, on a scale of -9 _o 0
self image = 2, on a scale of -9 to 9
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yes.
Based on feelings associated with _he event,
robs view of the erpected outcome is "judgea_negatively" leading to an
Overall affect pattern = [-4,-2,-3,0,-4,2,011]
= [Anxiety, Pleasure, Boredom.
Pride. Shame, Self_Image New,
8a_pinesa_New, Self_Esteem_Ne.]
and an associated Need_Lis_ = [4,11,3,9,4,7,9,B]
which is the difference between the ideal state and
robs current overall affect pattern
CONTINUE? (yes., no.)
yes.
Sased on the preconditions of the task and _he relevant
needs, the following procedures are available to rob
--- computing ---
procedurel = ineffective_s_rategiea, Resultant affect total = -18
procedure2 = defensive_withdrawal. Resultan_ affec_ total = -9
procedure3 : task_avoidance, Resultant affec_ total = -5
procedure4 = self_aggrandizement, Resultant affect total = -2
procedure5 = devalue_task, Rasultan_ affect %oral = -6
Selected procedure is self_aggrandizement
If Fou want to try the program again, type "dldb."
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